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DOWNSTREAM MERGERS AND ENTRY 
 






  We consider an upstream firm selling an input to several downstream firms 
through observable two-part tariff contracts. Downstream firms can alternatively buy 
the input from a less efficient source of supply. We show that downstream mergers lead 
to lower wholesale prices. They translate into lower final prices only when the 
alternative supply is inefficient enough. Downstream mergers are very profitable in this 
setting and monopolization is the equilibrium outcome of a merger game even for 
unconcentrated markets. Finally, the expectation of monopolization stimulates wasteful 
entry of downstream firms in the industry, which calls for policy intervention.  
Key words: downstream mergers, entry, two-part tariff contracts 
JEL codes: L11, L13 and L14. 
 1 Introduction
In the last few years, we have observed the rise of very large downstream ￿rms in previously
more fragmented industries such as retailing, farming, natural resource extraction and health.
The e⁄ect of downstream mergers on consumer surplus and social welfare is far from being clear
for industrial economists. The reason is that they a⁄ect two di⁄erent dimensions. On the one
hand, they have an e⁄ect on the supply side of the market, by allowing downstream ￿rms to get
better deals from suppliers. On the other hand, they reduce competition downstream. The key
point to assess the welfare e⁄ect of mergers is whether the lower wholesale prices obtained by
downstream ￿rms are passed on to consumers.
In order to address this question, we consider a model with an upstream ￿rm selling an input
to several downstream ￿rms competing ￿ la Cournot in a homogeneous good ￿nal market. They
can alternatively obtain the input from a less e¢ cient source of supply. The upstream ￿rm o⁄ers
observable two-part tari⁄ contracts to downstream ￿rms. It uses the wholesale price to control
the level of competition downstream and the ￿xed fee to extract the surplus. As a result, we get
that the wholesale price is increasing in the number of downstream ￿rms. This result suggests
that downstream mergers could lead to a reduction in the ￿nal price paid by consumers. We ￿nd
that if there is strong market power in the upstream sector, downstream mergers countervail the
market power of the dominant supplier leading to a reduction in the ￿nal price. As a result, in
this context, downstream mergers are pro-competitive.
Our paper is related to von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) and Dobson and Waterson (1997). The
key di⁄erence with our paper is that they consider linear supply contracts. They obtain that
downstream mergers lead to lower ￿nal prices only when there exists enough competition in
the downstream market. Caprice (2005,2006) study a similar model but assuming secret supply
2contracts. In Caprice (2005), it is shown that the upstream ￿rm may be better-o⁄ the higher
the level of competition downstream. The reason is that competition reduces the outside option
of ￿rms. Caprice (2006) shows that banning price discrimination may be welfare improving in
the presence of an alternative supply.
After the analysis of the welfare e⁄ects of downstream mergers, we turn our attention to
their pro￿tability. Again, the degree of competition upstream plays a key role. In particular, we
show that when the alternative supply is ine¢ cient, downstream mergers are pro￿table, because
they countervail the dominant position of the upstream ￿rm. Indeed, in an endogenous merger
formation game, we get that monopolization is the equilibrium outcome even for very uncon-
centrated industries. This result deeply contrasts with the one obtained by Kamien and Zang
(1990) for Cournot markets, where monopolization only occurs for very concentrated markets.
In a vertical structure, pro￿tability of downstream mergers was also obtained in Lommerud
et al. (2005, 2006). In the former paper, they consider three downstream ￿rms, each of them
contracting in exclusivity with an upstream ￿rm. The supply contracts are linear. In this setting,
the merger of two downstream ￿rms is shown to be pro￿table because it generates competition
between their suppliers, leading to a reduction in input prices. In the latter paper, the same
idea is applied to study the pattern of mergers in an international context.
In the last part of the present paper, we analyze entry in the downstream sector. We show
that the expectation that the market will be monopolized stimulates entry in the downstream
market. In other words, ￿rms enter into the market with the sole purpose to be taken over. In
this context, entry has no e⁄ect on market structure and it results in a waste of resources. This
calls for policy intervention both in the form of entry and merger regulation.
The American sugar industry provides us a nice empirical example to illustrate this idea.
The American Sugar Re￿ning Company was created in 1888 through the merger of 20 plants.
3Later on, other ￿rms entered in the industry in the 1900￿ s and were bought out by American.
One of these entrants was the United States Sugar Re￿nery. Later events showed that it ought
to be built to be bought, since "lack of a proper water supply rendered it inoperative" (Zerbe
(1969)1
The relationship between mergers and entry has received attention from both theorists and
practitioners. Indeed, the general view of antitrust authorities in the last decades was to presume
that entry induced by mergers mitigates their anticompetitive e⁄ect. Many papers have analyzed
the issue, qualifying the antitrust view (among them, Werden and Froeb (1998), Spector (2003),
Cabral (2003) and Marino and Zabojnik (2006).
In the present paper, we depart from this literature because, in our case, the entry of ￿rms
precedes mergers. To the best of our knowledge, only two papers have considered this order
of moves. On the one hand, Rasmusen (1988) studies how the expectation of future buyouts
reduces the ability of the incumbent to deter entry. Antelo and Bru (2005) study the connection
between merger policy and ￿rms￿incentives to enter in an upstream market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze the optimal
supply contracts taken a market structure as given. In Section 3, we solve an endogenous
merger game to analyze the pro￿tability of downstream mergers. Section 4 analyzes entry into
the downstream sector. Finally, Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
1Elzinga (1970) reports another illustrative case where a worker left his job at the Gunpowder Trust and created
a new gunpowder ￿rm which was quickly sold to the Trust. After a while, he started a new ￿rm which was also
sold. Some years later, another ex-employee founded a new ￿rm that was sold out to the Trust. Interestingly, the
buyout contract included a provision that the seller stayed out of the power business for twenty years.
42 Model with an exogenous market structure
We consider an upstream ￿rm that produces an input at cost cu: A number n of downstream ￿rms
transform this input into a ￿nal homogenous good on a one-to-one basis, without additional
costs. Downstream ￿rms may alternatively obtain the input from a competitive supply at cost
c < a. Inverse demand for the ￿nal good is given by P = a ￿ Q, where Q is the total amount
produced.
The upstream ￿rm sets observable vertical contracts that establish the terms under which
inputs are transferred. After contracts are set, competition downstream is ￿ la Cournot. More
speci￿cally, the game is modelled according to the following timing: ￿rst, the supplier o⁄ers
a two-part tari⁄ contract (F;w) to downstream ￿rms, where F speci￿es a non-negative ￿xed
amount and w a wholesale price. Second, downstream ￿rms decide whether or not to accept
the contract. The ones that accept, pay F to the upstream ￿rm. Finally, they compete ￿ la
Cournot.
Assume that k ￿rms have accepted a supply contract (F;w). Firms that have not accepted










Observe that, if w is very low, the ￿rms that do not accept the contract are driven out of the











Pro￿ts of non-accepting and accepting ￿rms are given, respectively, by ￿N(k;w) = (qN(k;w))
2
and ￿(k;w) = (q(k;w))
2.
5In the second stage, downstream ￿rms accept the contract o⁄ered by the upstream ￿rm
whenever F ￿ ￿(k;w) ￿ ￿N(k ￿ 1;w). Obviously, as the upstream ￿rm maximizes pro￿ts, in
order for k ￿rms to accept the contract,2 it will choose F such that F = ￿(k;w)￿￿N(k￿1;w).
This implies that the problem of choosing the optimal contract (F;w) is equivalent to that of
choosing (k;w). Then, in the ￿rst stage, the upstream solves the following problem:
Max k
k;w
(￿(k;w) ￿ ￿N(k ￿ 1;w) + (w ￿ cu)q(k;w)) (1)
s:t: 1 ￿ k ￿ n and w ￿ c.
We proceed as follows. First of all, we prove that the upstream ￿rm ￿nds pro￿table to
sell the input to all ￿rms in the downstream sector. Then, we calculate the optimal wholesale
price once we replace k by n in expression (1). As far as the ￿rst result is concerned, we know
that with a ￿xed fee contract, the input would be sold to only a subset of ￿rms in order to
protect industry pro￿ts from competition (Kamien and Tauman (1986)). With a two-part tari⁄
contract, however, the upstream ￿rm can always sell to one more ￿rm without a⁄ecting the level
of competition, by choosing an appropriate wholesale price. Assume that the upstream ￿rm sells
to k ￿rms with a wholesale price w < c. It is direct to see that he can always sell to all ￿rms
with a w < wc < c such that the ￿nal price remains constant.3 In other words, the upstream
￿rm may always use the wholesale price to control for competition.4 Next proposition shows
that this particular contract increases the pro￿ts of the upstream ￿rm.
Lemma 1 Let ￿(k;w) represent the upstream pro￿t if the upstream ￿rm sells to k ￿rms and sets
2As
@(￿(k;w)￿￿N(k￿1;w))
@k < 0, this is the only equilibrium in the acceptance stage.
3Observe that selling to all ￿rms with a wholesale price w would decrease the ￿nal price and that selling to all
￿rms with a wholesale price equal to c would increase the price.
4This argument is used in Sen and Tauman (2007) to prove that with an auction plus royalty contract, the
input would be sold to all ￿rms.
6wholesale price w ￿ c. Then ￿(n;w1) ￿ ￿(k;w) where w1 solves nq(n;w1) = (n ￿ k)qN(k;w) +
kq(k;w).
Proof. We have that
￿(k;w) = (P ￿ cu)((n ￿ k)qN(k;w) + kq(k;w)) ￿ k(qN(k ￿ 1;w))
2 ￿ (n ￿ k)(qN(k;w))
2 ￿
￿(c ￿ cu)(n ￿ k)qN(k;w):
Observe that if the upstream sells to n ￿rms with the wholesale price w1, the ￿rst term in
the above expression will also appear in ￿(n;w1). Then the di⁄erence in pro￿ts is given by:
￿(n;w1) ￿ ￿(k;w) = k(qN(k ￿ 1;w))
2 + (n ￿ k)(qN(k;w))
2 +
+(c ￿ cu)(n ￿ k)qN(k;w) ￿ n(qN(n ￿ 1;w1))
2 :
In order to prove the proposition we have to check the previous expression is non-negative
in the following three di⁄erent regions:
when c ￿ w > c +
￿a + c
k
, where qN(k;w) > 0 and qN(k ￿ 1;w) > 0,
when ￿a+ck
￿1+k < w ￿ c +
￿a + c
k
, where qN(k;w) = 0 and qN(k ￿ 1;w) > 0 and
when w ￿ ￿a+ck
￿1+k , where qN(k;w) = 0 and qN(k ￿ 1;w) = 0.
If c ￿ w > c +
￿a + c
k
, we have that w ￿ w1 =
c(n￿k)+kw
n ￿ c and
￿(n;w1) ￿ ￿(k;w) > k(qN(k ￿ 1;w))
2 + (n ￿ k)(qN(k;w))
2 ￿ n(qN(n ￿ 1;w1))
2 = (2)
=




￿1+k < w ￿ c +
￿a + c
k
; we have that w < w1 =
a(n￿k)+k(n+1)w
(k+1)n < c and qN(k;w) = 0.
We have to distinguish two cases:
If
c(1+k)n2￿a(k+n2)
k(n2￿1) < w ￿ c+
￿a + c
k
, we have that qN(n￿1;w1) > 0. To sign the di⁄erence
in pro￿ts we obtain that
kqN(k ￿ 1;w) ￿ nqN(n ￿ 1;w1) ￿ 0:
7This implies that
￿(n;w1) ￿ ￿(k;w) = k(qN(k ￿ 1;w))
2 ￿ n(qN(n ￿ 1;w1))
2 > 0:
If ￿a+ck
￿1+k < w ￿
c(1+k)n2￿a(k‘+n2)
k(n2￿1) ; then w1 ￿ ￿a+cn
￿1+n and, therefore, qN(n￿1;w1) = 0. Then,
￿(n;w1) ￿ ￿(k;w) = k(qN(k ￿ 1;w))
2 > 0:
If w ￿ ￿a+ck
￿1+k , we have that w1 =
a(n￿k)+k(n+1)w
(k+1)n ￿ ￿a+cn
￿1+n and, therefore, qN(n ￿ 1;w1) = 0.
As we have also that qN(k ￿ 1;w) = 0, then
￿(n;w1) ￿ ￿(k;w) = 0
This result is central to the paper and, therefore, it seems interesting to know whether it
holds for more general demand functions. In the Appendix, we show that it holds for concave
demands satisfying a technical restriction concerning the third derivative of the inverse demand.
We show that it also holds for the class of demands P = A ￿ Xb, where b ￿ 1.
Next, we derive the optimal two-part tari⁄ contract to sell to n ￿rms.
Proposition 1 The upstream ￿rm optimally sells the input to all ￿rms with a wholesale price
w￿(n) =
(n￿1)(2c+cu￿a)+2c1
2(1￿n+n2) if c <
a￿cu+(a+cu)n2




This result has been independently obtained in Erutku and Richelle (2007) for the case of a
research laboratory licensing a cost-reducing innovation to a n-￿rm Cournot oligopoly through
observable two-part tari⁄ licensing contracts. However, Lemma 1 allows for a simpler and more
intuitive proof and we generalize the result for the case of non-linear demands.
8The optimal wholesale price arises from the balance of two con￿ icting incentives. On the one
hand, maximizing industry pro￿ts requires a high wholesale price; on the other hand, reducing
the outside option of downstream ￿rms asks for a low wholesale price. Observe that whenever c ￿
a￿cu+(a+cu)n2
2n2 , the alternative supply is irrelevant and the upstream ￿rm obtains the monopoly
pro￿ts. In this case, as n increases the wholesale price is adjusted upwards in order to implement
the monopoly price in the ￿nal market. On the other hand, if c <
a￿cu+(a+cu)n2
2n2 , w￿(n) is an
increasing function of n and tends to c as n tends to in￿nity.5 Observe that the restriction that
the wholesale price can not be higher than c is never binding.
It is interesting to emphasize the key role played by parameter c. It a⁄ects the way in which
the upstream ￿rm adjusts the wholesale price as n changes. The higher the value of c, the faster
the wholesale price changes. This is very important because only when the wholesale price
adjusts very fast to changes in n, it may be the case that a reduction in n leads to a reduction
in the ￿nal price paid by consumers. And this happens for high values of c.




2(1+n3) if c ￿ a+cu
2 or c > a+cu












2c￿a￿cu, it is constant. For c > a+cu
2 and n <
q
a￿cu
2c￿a￿cuor c ￿ a+cu
2 , the sign of the
derivative of price with respect to n is given by the sign of the following expression6:
R(n;c) = ￿cu(￿1 + n)(1 + n)3 + 2cn(￿2 + 3n + n3) ￿ a(1 ￿ 2n + 6n2 ￿ 2n3 + n4) (4)
5This holds for any n ￿ 2. Observe that, if c <
a+3c1
4 , w
￿(1) = c1 > w
￿(2).
6Note that this refers to the case n ￿ 2. We have that P
￿(1) > P
￿(2) regardless of c.
9Figure 1: Comparative statics of price
It is direct to see that (4) is positive when c > c0, where7 c0 < a+cu
2 . Therefore, downstream
mergers reduce price whenever the level of competition upstream is low. For illustrative purposes,
Figure 1 plots the values (n;c) such that R(n;c) = 0 for the particular case cu = 0.
Observe that, in this model, given that all downstream ￿rms buy the input from the e¢ cient
supplier, social welfare is a decreasing function of price. Then, we have that the welfare e⁄ect
of downstream mergers depends on their e⁄ect on the ￿nal price we have just studied. This
e⁄ect depends on c, that parametrizes the level of competition upstream. For high values of c,
horizontal mergers downstream countervail the dominant position of the upstream ￿rm, leading
to a price reduction. On the other hand, for low values of c, there is little market power to
countervail and then downstream mergers have the main e⁄ect of reducing competition, leading
to a price increase.
7The value of c








4(1+n+n3+n4) if c ￿ a+cu
2 or c > a+cu












if c ￿ a+cu
2 or c > a+cu






Concerning the upstream pro￿ts we have that the upstream pro￿ts are increasing in n for
c > c", where8 c" < c0 <
a + cu
2
. Combining this result with the one on welfare, it is easy to
see that any merger that increases the upstream pro￿ts reduces social welfare. This result is
very intuitive because horizontal mergers increase welfare only when they countervail the selling
power of the upstream ￿rm.
Concerning joint downstream pro￿ts, we have that they are decreasing in n. The fact that
downstream mergers increase joint pro￿ts does not imply that there will be private incentives to
merge, due to their public good nature. This is what we analyze in the next section, designing an
endogenous merger formation game. Here, we only want to emphasize how merger pro￿tability
depends on c. A merger of k + 1 ￿rms is pro￿table if
￿D(n ￿ k) ￿ (k + 1)￿D(n) ￿ 0: (6)
This condition holds if c ￿
a ￿ cu + (a + cu)n2
2n2 because, in this case, ￿D(n) = 0. Otherwise, it
is useful to study pro￿tability rewriting (6) in the following way:
￿D(n ￿ k)
￿D(n)
￿ (k + 1):
It is direct to see that the left hand side of the inequality is increasing in c. This means that
mergers become more likely as c increases, that is, as the market power of the upstream ￿rm
8The value of c" is given by c" =
cu(1+n)3+a(n￿1)(1+(￿4+n)n)
2n(4+(n￿1)n) .
11increases. Bru and Fauli-Oller (2003) obtain the same result but considering secret supply
contracts. Let us now introduce a merger formation game.
3 An endogenous merger game
The most widely accepted merger game is the one developed by Kamien and Zang (1990, 1991,
1993). In Kamien and Zang (1990) each ￿rm simultaneously chooses a bid for each competitor
and an asking price. A ￿rm is sold to the highest bidder whose bid exceeds the ￿rm￿ s asking
price. They get that, with linear demand and Cournot competition, monopolization does not
occur when we have three or more ￿rms. Buying ￿rms is expensive because, by not accepting a
bid, a ￿rm free-rides on the reduction in competition induced by the remaining acquisitions.
In this section, we design a merger game inspired in the previous papers in order to endogenize
the market structure. For simplicity, we restrict attention to a simple game where there is only
one acquiring ￿rm. Observe this assumption makes it more di¢ cult to get monopolization.
In order to be able to explicitly solve the merger game, we have to ￿x a value for parameter c.
We want to analyze how pro￿table downstream mergers are in the presence of endogenous input
prices. Then, given that merger pro￿tability increases with c, we choose the largest value such




. As we will see below, with the downstream pro￿ts inherited from the contract
game of the previous section, the only equilibrium of the merger game is monopolization even
for very unconcentrated industries.
More speci￿cally, the timing of the game is the following: we assume that there are, initially,
N symmetric downstream ￿rms in the industry. One of them, say ￿rm 1, can make simultaneous
bids to acquire rival ￿rms.
In the ￿rst stage, ￿rm 1 o⁄ers bids bi to buy ￿rm i (i = 2;::n). In the second stage, these
12￿rms decide simultaneously whether to accept the bid or not. If ￿rm i accepts the o⁄er, it sells
the ￿rm to ￿rm 1 at the price bi. Given the equilibrium market structure that results at the end
of stage two, the contract game of the previous section is played.
We solve by backward induction starting at stage two. Suppose that at the end of stage






This expression is obtained just by plugging c =
a + cu
2
into expression (5). Observe that, in
this case, the pro￿ts of downstream ￿rms are always strictly positive.
Firms will accept the o⁄ers of ￿rm 1 whenever the bid is not lower than their outside option,
which of course depends on the acceptance decisions of the other ￿rms. If, for example, k ￿ 1
￿rms (other than ￿rm j) accepted, the outside option of ￿rm j would be ￿D(N ￿ k + 1). At
the ￿rst stage, ￿rm 1 has to decide the number of ￿rms to acquire, taking into account that in
order to buy k ￿rms it has to make a bid of ￿D(N ￿ k + 1). Then, the payo⁄ of ￿rm 1 as a
function of the number of acquisitions k is given by:
￿D(N ￿ k) ￿ k￿D(N ￿ k + 1) (7)
The maximizer of the previous expression is k = N ￿1 if N ￿ 21 and k = 0 otherwise. This
result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If N ￿ 21, monopolization takes place. Otherwise, no merger occurs.
Proof. See Appendix
A natural question to address at this point is whether competition authorities should allow
for monopolization. In order to answer this question recall that, in this model, social welfare is
13inversely related to price, which is given by:
P￿(n) =
a(2 ￿ n + n3) + cu(n + n3)
2(n + 1)3 .
This expression is obtained just by plugging c =
a + cu
2
into expression (3). Then, one can check
that mergers up to duopoly reduce price and that price is maximized in monopoly. Therefore,
the optimal merger policy should allow all mergers except the one leading to monopolization.
Similar calculations as in Proposition 3 show that, under the optimal merger policy, mergers up
to duopoly would take place whenever N < 13.
4 An entry game
In the previous section, the initial number of ￿rms was ￿xed to N. In this section, we endogenize
the number of ￿rms by building an entry game, which is played before the merger game. We
assume, for simplicity, that there is one incumbent monopoly9 (￿rm 1) that is already present
in the market. This ￿rm will be the one making o⁄ers in the merger game. There is an in￿nite
number of potential entrants. In order to enter, they have to incur in a ￿xed cost of entry K,
which is assumed to be sunk at the beginning of the merger game. After entry, ￿rms have the
same production technology as the incumbent ￿rm.
Any potential entrant knows that, whenever the number of active ￿rms is lower than 22,
they will be bought in the merger game, obtaining their outside option, which amounts to the
duopoly pro￿ts. If the number of ￿rms is higher than 21, no merger will take place. Then, the
pro￿ts of ￿rms in the entry game (gross of any entry cost) as a function of the number of active





￿D(2) if N ￿ 21
￿D(N) if N > 21
9We could think of a regulated market which faces a liberalization process.
14If K > ￿D(2), no ￿rm enters and the incumbent operates as a monopolist. Otherwise, the
number of active ￿rms is the N satisfying:
￿E(N) ￿ K > ￿E(N + 1)
The lowest N that satis￿es this expression is N = 21. The next proposition summarizes the
equilibrium number of active ￿rms in the entry game:
Proposition 3 The equilibrium number of active ￿rms in the entry game is as follows:
N￿(K) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
int[ b N] if K ￿ ￿D(22)
21 if ￿D(22) < K ￿ ￿D(2)
1 if K > ￿D(2)







It is interesting to compare this result on entry with the classical free-entry model with
Cournot competition and no merger game. While in the latter case, the active number of ￿rms
decreases smoothly with the ￿xed cost, in our entry game there is a big jump when the entry
cost is lower than the duopoly pro￿ts. Entry is stimulated by the fact that the merger game
pushes up the outside option of entrants. Whenever ￿D(22) < K ￿ ￿D(2), entry occurs up to
the point in which further entry would stop the merger process. In other words, in our model,
￿rms enter with the sole purpose of being acquired by the incumbent.
Observe that entry in our model has no e⁄ect on competition, when the equilibrium number
of ￿rms after the merger game remains constant. Therefore, the only e⁄ect of entry is a wasteful
expenditure of resources. In terms of social welfare, the optimal market structure would be to
have a duopoly in equilibrium whenever the entry cost is K <
a2
18
. This could be achieved by






, entry should be subsidized if ￿





15the optimal market structure we would need the combination of entry and merger regulations.
If only entry regulations can be used, for K <
a2
21298
, the optimal policy would be to allow
entry up to the lowest number of ￿rms such that no merger takes places.11 Otherwise, no entry
should be allowed.
If only a merger policy can be used, things become more complicated. However some results
can be obtained. For example, allowing all mergers except monopolization is superior to no
merger policy. The reason is that forbidding merger to monopoly reduces entry and leads to
duopoly, reducing the ￿nal price. On the other hand, it can be shown that allowing all mergers
except monopolization is superior to forbidding all mergers. The latter policy implies less entry
which is good for welfare at the cost of preventing price reductions due to mergers. Overall, the
social gains produced by the mergers to duopoly would o⁄set the higher cost of entry.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed how a process of market concentration in the downstream sector a⁄ects ￿nal
prices through its e⁄ect on the supply contracts o⁄ered by an upstream ￿rm. We show that
downstream mergers induce the upstream ￿rm to o⁄er lower wholesale prices. This reduction
o⁄sets the anticompetitive e⁄ect of mergers, only when the upstream ￿rm enjoys a strong dom-
inant position. In this case, downstream mergers countervail the market power of the dominant
supplier, leading to an increase in social welfare.
A natural question is then to ask whether monopolization downstream can be the equilib-
rium outcome of an endogenous merger formation game. Contrarily to what happens when
input prices are exogenous, we obtain that monopolization occurs even for very unconcentrated




453604804, entry should be subsidized if ￿





16Our results call for a lenient merger policy towards downstream mergers. However, in in-
dustries with low entry barriers, a laissez-faire merger policy would lead to excessive entry. It is
shown that ￿rms would enter with the sole purpose to be bought, which eliminates any potential
bene￿t of entry and calls for policy intervention.
To conclude, we want to discuss more carefully the role played by c, the price of the alternative
supply. This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of competition upstream.
The larger c the higher the monopolistic power of the dominant upstream ￿rm. Then, it would
be interesting to study settings where the parameter c is endogenously determined. One possible
application would be to consider that the alternative supply is an international market for the
input and the upstream supplier is a national ￿rm. In this setting, it would be of interest the
analysis of the optimal tari⁄. The e⁄ect of this trade policy on welfare is not straightforward
though. On the one hand, a tari⁄ would increase the ￿nal price for a given number of ￿rms,
which hurts consumers and welfare. On the other hand, the imposition of a tari⁄would increase
the monopolistic power of the upstream ￿rm, which induces more mergers downstream. But in
our model, downstream mergers may be welfare enhancing. The ￿nal e⁄ect of a tari⁄ would
depend on the balance of these two e⁄ects. This and some other possible applications of our
model are left for future research.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 with a general demand
Assume we have n ￿rms and market demand is given by P(X), where P0(X) < 0 and
P"(X) ￿ 0. Firms have constant marginal costs. Denote by C the sum of marginal costs. Then
in an interior equilibrium we have that:
17nP(X) ￿ C + P0(X)X = 0 (8)













) ￿ 0 (9)
where C￿ = (n ￿ k + 1)c + (k ￿ 1)w, C = (n ￿ 1)w1 + c and C = (n ￿ k)c + kw. We have also
that C￿ ￿ C =
(n￿k)(c￿w)
n and C ￿ C =
k(c￿w)






















It is tedious but direct to show that ￿"(C) > 0 if ￿P0(X) is log-concave and P000(X) ￿ 0.
We show that it also holds for the class of demands P = A ￿ Xb, where b ￿ 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
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if w < ￿a+cn
n￿1
(10)
s:t:w ￿ c (11)
18Direct resolution of this problem leads to the result in Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
The objective of ￿rm 1 is given by expression (7):
F(N;k) = ￿D(N ￿ k) ￿ k￿D(N ￿ k + 1)
Simple computations show that whenever N < 25, the result in the text holds. For N ￿ 25 ,




This implies that for N ￿ 9 ￿ k ￿ 2; we have that
￿D(N ￿ k)
￿D(N ￿ k + 1)
< 2. This implies that
F(N;k) < 0. For N ￿ 1 ￿ k ￿ N ￿ 8, simple computations show that F(N;k) < 0. Finally,
k = 1 yields less pro￿ts that k = 0, because of (12).
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